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Private/Property: A Discourse on Gender
Inequality in American Law
Kevin C. Paul*
This essay examines the nature of gender inequality as it is
manifest in American law. It focuses on the historical notion that
women exist as legal possessions of men and argues that contem-
porary legal discourse both embodies and perpetuates this notion
by creating a distinction between public and private reality.'
Part One constructs an historical framework exploring the
ancient conceptualization of women as possessible objects and the
manifestations of that conceptualization in early American law.
The discussion narrows to consider the received doctrine of cover-
ture as illustrative of the overtly patriarchal roots of the American
legal structure. The depth of those roots is then demonstrated
through brief consideration of Married Women's Property Acts.
Allegedly the downfall of coverture, the acts are shown to have
ratified pre-existing, socially accepted property rights while leav-
ing the basic patriarchal structure unaltered. That structure is
further examined as manifest in modern social convention, histori-
cally, and to some degree still, recognized as part of the legal rela-
tionship between women and men. Part One concludes with the
caveat that although contemporary law apparently has divested it-
self of most, if not all, overt reference to women as chattel, the
conclusion that women have entirely transcended legal
"thinghood" ought not be hastily drawn.
Part Two attempts to illuminate one of those dark corners of
contemporary law in which women, given the proper context, re-
main very much the personal property of men. The discussion
first looks to early rape laws, demonstrating the historical legal
protection provided a man's exclusive claim to "his woman," and
* J.D., University of Minnesota Law School, 1990. This article was a co-recipi-
ent of the Helen I. Kelly Award for best student article in Volume VII, Law & Ine-
quality. The author benefitted greatly from the advice and encouragement of
Gerald Torres. Special thanks to Sybil Tucker for a firm foundation and to Melanie
Lunsford for endless patience, support and inspiration.
1. This essay follows the lead of Tom Stoppard in his play Rosencrantz &
Guildenstern Are Dead, casting a spotlight on characters presumed minor and ob-
scure in order to attain an alternative vision of familiar events.
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then to the phenomenon of marital rape exceptions. Discounting
contract-oriented rationalizations, the conclusion is drawn that
these provisions, medieval holdovers still in force in roughly half
the states, are rooted in the status-based doctrine of property law.
Part Three carries the discussion to more theoretical ground,
probing one of the justifications proffered for marital rape excep-
tions and, furthermore, for many sex-differentiating laws: the
existence of "naturally-defined" sex roles. A few western political
thinkers of old are canvassed to provide a base for investigating
American law's reception of this rationale. Two important and fa-
miliar cases, Bradwell v. State of Illinois 2 and Muller v. Oregon,3
illustrate the ease with which American law satisfied itself that
women are essentially "out of place" in the extra-domestic sphere
of social production. While the labor demands of capitalist society
might require some infusion of women into limited sectors outside
the home, Bradwell and Muller suggest, nature demands women
function primarily, if not exclusively, as wives and mothers. To-
gether, these cases provide the springboard from which to launch a
broadened discourse as to the distinction they draw between "pub-
lic" and "private" life.
After sketching the outlines of the public-private distinction,
the essay attempts to paint that distinction in contemporary hues
provided by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Wim-
berly v. Labor & Industrial Relations Commission.4 Justice
O'Connor's opinion for a unanimous Court is observed through
"private eyes," revealing its guarantee of "equal treatment" as, at
best, an ideological diversion and, at worst, a promise of continued
material inequity. The discussion broadens yet again to encompass
American jurisprudence in general and forges a link between the
public-private distinction and the material reality of legal objectiv-
ity to demonstrate the ideological nature of "equal treatment" dis-
course within the confines of American liberalism.
The essay concludes in an encounter with a very different
perspective on law and its societal function-that created by exam-
ining law through a feminist lens. Feminism, the essay argues, is
uniquely capable of demystifying the link between the public-pri-
vate distinction reified in American law and the subordinate status
imposed upon women in contemporary society. By revealing wo-
man's private reality as entirely political, feminist critique pro-
vides the framework for legal argument transcending the notion of
2. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
3. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
4. 479 U.S. 511 (1987).
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male-defined, public equal treatment with a demand for universal
treatment as an equal. 5 The essay closes with the observation that
legal discourse must be reshaped to accommodate the whole of wo-
men's reality, confronting the inferior and objectified status neces-
sarily perpetuated by the public-private distinction, if it is to
provide a viable mechanism for effecting material equality.
I. The Historical Framework: Woman as Chattel6
Throughout most of Western history, women have been re-
garded as property 7-men's property.8 Our culture is replete with
5. The distinction I draw between "equal treatment" and "treatment as an
equal" is not intended to suggest complete agreement with the similar distinction
drawn by Ronald Dworkin. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 227
(1978):
There are two different sorts of rights .... The first is the right to
equal treatment, which is the right to an equal distribution of some op-
portunity or resource or burden .... The second is the right to treat-
ment as an equal, which is the right, not to receive the same
distribution of some burden or benefit, but to be treated with the same
respect and concern as anyone else. If I have two children, and one is
dying from a disease that is making the other uncomfortable, I do not
show equal concern if I flip a coin to decide which should have the re-
maining dose of a drug. This example shows that the right to treat-
ment as an equal is fundamental, and the right to equal treatment,
derivative. In some circumstances the right to treatment as an equal
will entail a right to equal treatment, but not, by any means, in all
circumstances.
Id.
6. "Men (sic) make their own history, but they do not make it just as they
please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under
circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past." Karl Marx,
The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte in The Marx-Engels Reader 594, 595
(Richard Tucker ed. 1978).
7. "That is property to which the following label can be attached. To the
world: Keep off unless you have my permission, which I may grant or withhold.
Signed: Private citizen. Endorsed: The State." Felix Cohen, Dialogue on Private
Property, 9 Rutgers L. Rev. 357, 374 (1954).
Broadly speaking, [western] attitudes to property are associated with
the development of capitalism and with the notion of the commodity.
Property for us is based on the idea of 'private ownership' which con-
fers on the individual the right to use and to disposal. Property is thus
seen as valued goods/objects which can be transferred between legally-
constructed individuals.
Renee Hirschon, Introduction: Property, Power and Gender Relations in Women
and Property-Women as Property 2 (Renee Hirschon ed. 1984).
8. As noted by Andrea Dworkin, women have been the chattel property of
men within a patriarchal society that has existed from five to twelve thousand
years. Andrea Dworkin, Pornography: Men Possessing Women 101 (1981). The
genesis of male supremacy in human society has been the subject of much debate.
See, e.g., Toward an Anthropology of Women, (Rayma Reiter ed. 1975); Susan
Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape (1975); Simone deBeauvoir,
The Second Sex (1974); Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex (1970); Friedrich
Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State in The Marx-En-
gels Reader 734 (Richard Tucker ed. 1978). I will not join the debate over origins,
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the image of women as mere personal effects of the men who lay
claim to them.9 All that, however, is ancient history. "It is fash-
ionable [and comfortable] to think that women, who have come a
long way baby, are entirely removed from chattel'O status. It is
fashionable to think that the chattel status of women is ancient,
buried with the old cities of defunct civilizations.'., While fashion-
able and comfortable, the supposition that women's chattel status
exists as a dusty artifact of the distant past is also wrong. A pass
through the pages of American legal history reveals that American
law from the outset endorsed male dominance through the legal
fiction that women are objects in which men may assert and en-
force claims of ownership.
A. The Legal Status of Women in Colonial America
The early colonial period arguably was characterized by a
general leniency toward women.12 British colonists, faced with the
difficulties of subduing a new and vastly different environment,
instead accepting patriarchy as "a system of interrelated social structures through
which men exploit women" that remains, regardless of its origin, the bedrock of
western society. Sylvia Walby, Patriarchy At Work: Patriarchal and Capitalist Re-
lations in Employment 51 (1986). I also found Janet Rifkin's definition of patri-
archy useful in trying to understand better how male supremacy manifests itself in
American legal culture:
By patriarchy, I mean any kind of group organization in which males
hold dominant power and determine what part females shall and shall
not play, and in which capabilities assigned to women are relegated
generally to the mystical and aesthetic and excluded from the prac-
ticial and political realms, these realms being regarded as separate and
mutually exclusive.
Janet Rifkin, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy in Marxism and Law 295
(Piers Bierns & Richard Quinney eds. 1982).
9. "She is my goods, my chattels, she is my house, My household stuff, my
field, my bard, my horse, my ox, my ass, my anything." William Shakespeare, The
Taming of the Shrew 175 (H.J. Oliver ed. 1982) (Act II, scene 2). Although this
essay concentrates on the subjugation of women in Western culture-specifically,
Western legal culture-it is important to note that Eastern civilization has also fos-
tered and perpetuated a belief in women's inferiority. See Vern Bullough, The
Subordinate Sex: A History of Attitudes Toward Women 230-62 (1973).
10. "[Personal property] is also called a chattel, derived from cattle, the most
frequent form of personal wealth in the early days. John Cribbet, Principles of the
Law of Property 10 (1975) (emphasis added).
11. Andrea Dworkin, supra note 8, at 102. Careful reading of Dworkin's works
clarifies how deeply male domination is entrenched in every facet of American cul-
ture, most certainly including American law. In addition to Men Possessing Wo-
men, see Andrea Dworkin, Right Wing Women (1982).
12. See Albie Sachs & Joan Wilson, Sexism and the Law 69-75 (1978). Sachs
and Wilson suggest that during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, women
in the New World benefitted from generally loose adherence to English common
law, including its restrictions on women's activities. This is not to suggest that colo-
nial society was any less patriarchal than our own; women found themselves in ex-
tra-familial roles only as substitutes for dead or absent men. Id. at 71; cf. Marylynn
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were not particularly strict in their adherence to English common
law, preferring instead to develop local customs that more directly
addressed New World conditions.13 The result was a general ac-
ceptance of women in at least some extra-familial roles.
In Philadelphia, for example, women engaged in roughly
thirty different trades ranging from essential to luxury serv-
ices. They included female silversmiths, tin-workers, barbers,
bakers, fish picklers, brewers, tanners, ropemakers, lumber-
jacks, gunsmiths, butchers, milliners, harnessmakers, potash
manufacturers, upholsterers, printers, morticians, chandlers,
coachmakers, embroiderers, dry cleaners and dyers, wood-
workers, staymakers, tailors, flour processors, seamstresses,
netmakers, braziers, and founders. 14
B. The Legal Status of Women in Post-Revolutionary
America
Whatever de facto freedom colonial women may have en-
joyed to participate in society as "quasi-males" the Revolution and
independence brought to a grinding halt.'5 As the newly in-
dependent states turned from local ecclesiastical custom to more
secular doctrine,16 conservative aspects of English common law be-
Salmon, The Legal Status of Women in Early America: A Reappraisal, 1 Law &
Hist. Rev. 129 (1983).
13. Illustrative of these common law modifications was the practice of declaring
married women "feme-sole traders", a title that brought with it the right to sue,
engage in some business activity, transfer real property, and maintain power of at-
torney in their husbands' absence. It should be noted that this practice was mainly
one of economic necessity, spurred on by the need to continue "business as usual";
it was definitely not rooted in a pre-Revolutionary desire to enhance the legal posi-
tion of women. See Sachs & Wilson, supra note 12, at 69-70; see also Harry Stumpf,
American Judicial Politics 71 (1988) ("[T]hrough at least the early decades of colo-
nial history, law consisted of a rough-and-ready frontier justice based on the polit-
ical and social philosophies of the settlement leaders, frequently founded upon a
biblical ethic." Id.).
14. Sachs & Wilson, supra note 12, at 70.
15. Whatever Independence and the new Constitution might have done
to strengthen the rights of women as against the British Crown, they
did nothing to strengthen their rights vis-a-vis their own menfolk. On
the contrary, the post-Revolutionary period was one of declining legal
status for women, brought about either by the increase of citizenship
rights for men without an equivalent grant to women, or by the actual
cutting down on or eliminating of rights which colonial women had
exercised.
Id. at 69.
16. In nineteenth-century England, marriage and divorce were the province of
ecclesiastical courts, allowing the church an important role in the creation and
maintenance of family law. This tradition influenced the American colonies in their
early years. However, the absence of both ecclesiastical courts and a state-spon-
sored church fostered the rise of a far more secular legal system as the colonies
moved toward, and eventually gained, independence. See Lawrence Friedman, A
History of American Law 202 (2d ed. 1985).
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gan working their way into the evolving American legal system.
Indeed, the new state constitutions either expressly denied or im-
pliedly discouraged most of the political rights women were al-
lowed prior to 1776.17 For example, unmarried colonial women
who held enough property to qualify at least technically held the
right to vote on local issues. None of the state constitutions, how-
ever, with the exception of New Jersey, granted women the right
to vote. New Jersey "mended its ways" and rescinded women's
suffrage by amendment in 1807.18
Simply put, women, particularly married women, lost the
American Revolution. Prior to Independence, the legal reality of
colonial women had been as oppressive as ever-but the lived real-
ity of life in the colonies allowed some "feathering" around the
margins. In the two centuries that followed independence, how-
ever, women became the clearly established legal property of their
fathers and husbands. A married woman could not own property,
for she was property. Her personal "belongings," her children,19
even her own body were legal possessions of the man she wed.
20
In the eyes of early post-Revolutionary law, a woman, as a freely-
determined individual, simply did not exist.
C. And the Two Shall Become One: The Doctrine of
Coverture
The notion that a woman's existence was completely sub-
17. Sachs & Wilson, supra note 12, at 74.
18. New York was the first state to disenfranchise women expressly, inserting
the word "male" into its constitution in 1777. Eleven other states soon followed
suit. Even express disenfranchisement did not, however, greatly decrease the legal
status or political power of women since very few had either voted or held colonial
office. See Id. at 74.
19. The legal effects of marriage are generally deducible from the princi-
ple of the common law, by which the husband and wife are regarded
as one person, and her legal existence and authority in a degree lost or
suspended, during the continuance of the matrimonial union .... The
general rule is that the husband becomes entitled, upon the marriage,
to all the goods and chattels of the wife, and to the rents and profits of
her lands ....
2 James Kent, Commentaries on American Law *129-30 (Oliver W. Holmes ed.
1896).
20. See Andrea Dworkin & Catharine MacKinnon, Pornography and Civil
Rights: A New Day for Women's Equality, 12 (1988).
Put in the simplest terms: women were the chattel property of
men under law until the early part of the twentieth century. Married
women could not own property because they were property. A wo-
man's body, her children, and the clothes on her back belonged to her
husband. When the husband died, another male, not the mother, be-
came the legal guardian of the children .... Married women were
what nineteenth-century feminists called "civilly dead."
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sumed in that of her husband underlay the doctrine of coverture.
As explained by Blackstone:
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that
is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended
during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consoli-
dated into that of the husband; under whose wing, protection,
and cover, she performs everything... and her condition dur-
ing her marriage is called her coverture. Upon this principle,
of a union of person in husband and wife, depend almost all
the legal rights, duties, and disabilities, that either of them ac-
quire by the marriage .... For this reason, a man cannot
grant anything to his wife .... for the grant would be to sup-
pose her separate existence;...21
Receiving this medieval doctrine into American law, the men who
fashioned the early legal system effectively relegated women to
legal nonexistence and, at the same time, secured legal assurance
that the reigns of power would remain in male hands.22
D. Much Ado About Nothing: The Married Women's
Property Acts
The Married Women's Property Acts, passed in various forms
by every state during the nineteenth century, arguably lightened
the burden of coverture.23 Although these statutes expanded the
rights of women in some areas, they did not fundamentally alter
the legal relationship between women and men. In material
terms, the acts did little more than create room in the law for pre-
cedent social conditions that already permitted women to maintain
control of the property they brought with them into marriage.
"[M]ost of the acts were designed to establish simpler statutory
procedures [to protect] women's separate property, while changing
as little as possible the underlying institution of marriage."24
Not only were Married Women's Acts conservatively drafted
21. 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *430 (1765) (emphasis in original).
More recently, Justice Hugo Black described coverture as "the old common-law fic-
tion that the husband and wife are one. This rule has worked out in reality to
mean... the one is the husband." United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 361 (1966)
(Black, J., dissenting).
22. A graphic example of coverture in operation is provided by In re Lockwood.
In deciding whether women could be constitutionally prohibited from practicing
law in the state of Virginia, the United States Supreme Court left it to the state
supreme court to determine whether the word "person", which appeared in the
governing statute, included women. In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1896); see also
Commonwealth v. Welosky, 276 Mass. 398, 177 N.E. 656 (1931) ("No intention to in-
clude women can be deduced from the omission of the word male" Id. at 408, 177
N.E. at 661).
23. See Leo Kanowitz, Women and the Law: The Unfinished Revolution 40
(1970).
24. Barbara Allen Babcock, Ann Freedman, Eleanor Holmes Norton & Susan
1989]
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by male legislators, they were also narrowly interpreted by male
judges. 25 For example, the United States Supreme Court con-
cluded that the District of Columbia statute, guaranteeing married
women the right to property they held before or acquired during
marriage, did not extend to a woman's earnings. In Seitz v. Mitch-
ell,26 Mary Seitz challenged the seizure of two tracts of land, she
purchased with her own money, in satisfaction of a judgment
against her husband, George. The Court stated that, "nowhere, so
far as we are informed, has it been adjudged that [a woman's]
earnings or the product of them, made while she is living with her
husband and engaged in no separate business, are not the property
of the husband ... "27 Leaving no doubt as to the reach of the Dis-
trict's statute, the opinion concludes, "[h]er earnings while cohab-
iting with her husband are not made her property. She can have
them only by the gift of her husband, and such a gift is not pro-
tected against his creditors." 28
The narrow construction imposed on the District of Columbia
act in Seitz illustrates the modest impact these statutes had on the
material existence of American women. In short, while Married
Women's Property Acts marked a step toward recognition of wo-
men as legal persons, they did little to overcome the general un-
derstanding that a woman, once married, became the personal
property of her husband, to be moved about and used to suit his
pleasure.29
Ross, Sex Discrimination and the Law: Causes and Remedies 593 (1975) [hereinaf-
ter Sex Discrimination and the Law].
Most state legislators, however, voted for Married Women's Property
Acts on the basis of conservative economic reasoning designed to pro-
tect, not to liberate women. Unlike the equity procedures which they
replaced, these acts did not explicitly classify women with lunatics and
infants; but neither did they do anything to alter or reform prevailing
gender-based custom and stereotypic attitudes.
Albie Sachs & Joan Wilson, supra note 12, at 78.
25. "At no time in the course of the nineteenth century were Married Women's
Property Acts liberally interpreted by the lower courts." Sachs & Wilson, supra
note 12, at 78; see also, e.g., Joseph Warren, Husband's Rights to Wife's Services, 38
Harv. L. Rev. 421, 423 (1925) ("[I]nterpretation of [Married Women's Property Acts]
fell into the hands of judges who as young lawyers had been educated in the legal
supremacy of the husband."); Leo Kanowitz, supra note 23, at 40.
26. 94 U.S. 580 (1876).
27. Id. at 584.
28. Id. at 584-85.
29. [Married Women's Property Acts] were meant to rationalize more
cold-blooded matters, such as the rights of a creditor to collect debts
out of land owned by husbands, wives, or both. Most litigation over
married women's property was not litigation between spouses, or
within the family at all. In almost no case did a husband sue his wife
or vice versa. The typical cases, both before and after the married wo-
men's property acts .... were about the family's external relations, not
[Vol. 7:399
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E. What's In A Name?
Among the symbols of women's chattel status left untouched
by the Married Women's Acts was the legal requirement that a
woman replace her own last name with that of the man she mar-
ried. As stated by the Superior Court of the State of New York in
an 1881 opinion: "For several centuries, by the common law
among all English speaking people, a woman, upon her marriage,
takes her husband's surname. That becomes her legal name, and
she ceases to be known by her maiden name .... her maiden sur-
name is absolutely lost, and she ceases to be known thereby."30
Upon marriage, then, a woman was legally labeled with her hus-
band's identity, making clear to the world to whom she
"belonged."
This rule proved particularly resilient, maintaining its place
in American legal doctrine well into the twentieth century. In a
1945 opinion, for example, the Illinois Court of Appeals echoed nu-
merous previous decisions by declaring, "it is well settled by com-
mon-law principles and immemorial custom that a woman upon
marriage abandons her maiden name and takes the husband's sur-
name. . . ."31 And in 1971, the United States Supreme Court af-
firmed, without opinion, an Alabama requirement that a woman
adopt her husband's surname when applying for and receiving a
driver's license.32 Although the Court issued only a summary af-
firmance, the Sixth Circuit was persuaded, in 1976, that precedent
its internal life. Passage of these laws did not signal a revolution in
the status of women....
Lawrence Friedman, supra note 16, at 211; see also Porter v. Dunn, 131 N.Y.
314, 30 N.E. 122 (1892) (Despite the New York Married Women's Act, Mrs. Porter
was prohibited from recovering compensation for nursing an ailing boarder because
she did so with her husband's knowledge and was "engaged in no occupation sepa-
rate from that devolving upon her as a wife .... Id. at 317, 30 N.E. at 125).
30. Chapman v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank of the City of New York, 85 N.Y. 437, 449
(1881); see also, Bacon v. Boston Elev. R. Co., 256 Mass. 30, 152 N.E. 35 (1926), in
which a woman who registered her car in her own name was not allowed to recover
for the injuries she suffered in an automobile accident caused by the Railway Com-
pany's negligence because the car was registered "in a name that was not hers." Id.
at 32, 152 N.E. at 36. Although many judicial decisions about the right of married
women to retain their own surnames invoke the long-settled principles of common
law, "it was apparently not until Victorian times that [a woman's] loss of identity
generally included the loss of both her first and last names. And even then, it was
a matter of widespread custom, not law, in England." Sex Discrimination and the
Law, supra note 24, at 579 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
31. People v. Lipsky, 327 Ill. App. 63, 67, 63 N.E.2d 642, 644 (1945).
32. See Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Al. 1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 970
(1971); The trial court in Forbush stated:
Certainly the custom of the husband's surname denominating the wed-
ded couple is one of long standing. While its origin is obscure, it suf-
fices for our purposes to recognize that it is a tradition extending back
into the heritage of most western civilizations. It is a custom common
1989]
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required it to uphold a similar requirement, imposed by the state
of Kentucky, against a constitutional challenge. 33
The judiciary has not been alone in supporting the notion
that a woman ought be required to adopt the name of the man she
marries. Until very recently, many state name change statutes ex-
pressly excluded married women. For example, Iowa courts were
forbidden from granting a formal name change to married females
until 1972.34 Prior to 1981, the Iowa provision required: "If the pe-
titioner is married, the spouse must join in the petition or file writ-
ten consent with the petition." 35 Similarly, Missouri still permits
name changes only where a court "is satisfied that the desired
change would be proper and not detrimental to the interests of
any other person."3 6 Missouri courts have interpreted this statute
to require that the interests of a married woman's husband be con-
sidered before granting her name change petition. 37
F. A Man's Home Is His Castle: The Domicile
Requirement
Beyond replacing her name38 with that of her husband, a wo-
to all 50 states in this union. Uniformity among the several states in
this area is important.
Id. at 222; see also, Herma Kay, Sex-Based Discrimination 172 (1981); Sex Discrimi-
nation and the Law, supra note 24, at 579-83.
33. Whitlow v. Hodges, 539 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1976). "This court deems itself
bound by the Supreme Court affirmance in Forbush." Id. at 584; see also Herma
Kay, supra note 32, at 172-73. Worth noting is the California Court of Appeals'
opinion in Allyn v. Allison, 34 Cal. App. 3d 448, 110 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1973). The court
held women could constitutionally be required to use either "Miss" or "Mrs." on
voter registration materials. As suggested by Kenneth Karst, the opinion com-
pletely fails to recognize the harm involved in requiring a woman to officially de-
clare her relationship to men before she is allowed to exercise the most basic right
of citizenship. Kenneth Karst, A Discrimination So Trivial: A Note On Law and
the Symbolism of Women's Dependence, 35 Ohio St. L. J. 546 (1974); see also Leo
Kanowitz, supra note 23, at 43-44.
34. Iowa Code Ann. § 674.1 (1947), quoted in Leo Kanowitz, supra note 23, at
43.
35. Iowa Code Ann. § 674.6 (West Supp. 1988).
36. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 527.270 (Vernon 1988).
37. Matter of Natale, 527 S.W.2d 402 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
38. See William Matthews, Married Women and the Name Game, 11 U. Rich.
L. Rev. 121 (1976) regarding the intrinsic and social importance of names; cf. Karen
DeCrow, Sexist Justice 250 (1974):
When I got divorced for the second time, I thought I should get back
"my own name."
What was that? My first husband's last name wasn't my name. My
late father's last name wasn't my name. I thought of taking my
mother's maiden name, but realized that wasn't her name, but her late
father's.
I came to the conclusion that a woman has no name.
[Vol. 7:399
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man traditionally has also been expected to take up his residence
as her own. This social convention was, until very recently, widely
imposed by law. As noted by a New Jersey court in 1913, "[ilt is
familiar law that upon marriage the domicile of the wife merges
with that of the husband. It is a legal consequence of the nuptial
contract, and the unity of domicile exists during coverture, unless
the wife acquires one elsewhere by the husband's consent." 39
In the early nineteenth century, courts and commentators
often recognized this requirement as the natural product of cover-
ture.40 Yet, even when reference to coverture itself fell into disfa-
vor, there was no shortage of "policy reasons" for continuing
adherence to the domicile rule. Take, for example, the opinion of
the California Supreme Court in In re Wickes' Estate:
The subjection of the wife to the husband was not the only
reason for the [domicile] rule. Parties marrying contract to
live together. The husband obligates himself to furnish a
proper home for his wife, and to maintain her there in a de-
gree of comfort authorized by his circumstances, and they mu-
tually agreed to live there together. It is a matter of great
public concern that this should be so. In this association there
can be no majority vote, and the law leaves the ultimate deci-
sion to the husband. For the protection of the wife, she is al-
lowed a different forum, when necessary in legal proceedings
against her husband. In reality, this is not giving her a new
domicile, but she is allowed to bring these suits where she ac-
tually resides, though that be not her legal domicile .... There
are dependent persons other than married women who may
not select their own domicile-minors, for instance, and all
under guardianship. 41
And in a 1940 Tennessee case holding that a married woman may
acquire a domicile separate from her husband's, so long as he con-
39. In re Geiser's Will, 82 N.J.Eq. 311, 313, 87 A. 628, 629 (1913); see also In re
Paullin's Will, 92 N.J.Eq. 419, 113 A. 240 (1921) (legal presumption that wife's domi-
cile is that of her husband); Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 27 (1934) (a wife takes
her husband's domicile). The second Restatement generously modified this rule, al-
lowing a woman to acquire a separate domicile where "an actual rupture of marital
relations" has occurred. Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 21 comment d
(1971). Not until the 1986 revision of the second Restatement was the common law
rule that a woman necessarily adopts her husband's domicile at marriage aban-
doned. See Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 21 comment a (1986) ("The
common law rule . . . is clearly inconsistent with contemporary views relating to
the legal position of married women."). Note, however, that comment (a) proceeds
to assert that nothing has really changed, since the vast majority of women will live
in their husbands' homes. Id.
40. See Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws § 46 (1834) (the
rule that a woman's domicile is that of her husband "results from the general prin-
ciple that a person who is under the power and authority of another possesses no
right to choose a domicile."). Id.
41. In re Wickes' Estate, 128 Cal. 270, 278, 60 P. 867, 870 (1900).
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sents, one finds this explanation: "The rule of the common law
that the domicile of the wife follows that of the husband was based
on (1) the doctrine of marital unity [coverture], and (2) that public
policy demanded that the family unit be protected by allowing the
family to have only one domicile."42
Even as recently as 1987, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
seemed reluctant to discard the domicile rule completely. In Jones
v. Jones,43 the court concluded that, while it is usually applied in
determining a married couples' homestead, the rule "does not ap-
ply in all contexts."44 The point here is not that women remain
the property of their fathers or husbands because they are still
"given away" in traditional wedding ceremonies, 45 and are after-
ward expected to trade the last name and legal residence of the
one for that of the other.46 Although these archaic customs re-
main part of social convention, they, as well as many other overtly
sexist practices, are no longer enforced by law. Yet, that American
law throughout most of its history affirmatively assigned women
the status of "objects" in their relationships to and with men ought
not be entirely overlooked in contemplating the contemporary
legal landscape. It is easy to assume that women have transcended
property status because the law no longer expressly refers to them
as such. Grounding that assumption in the lived reality of women
is, however, a great deal more difficult.
II. In Dimly Lit Corners: Marital Rape
Despite the allegedly "progressive" state of contemporary
American society, open and candid discussion of sex and sexuality
remains largely taboo. It is, therefore, not surprising that legal
regulation of sexual conduct constitutes one of the more dimly lit
corners of American law. Nevertheless, the way sexual relation-
ships between women and men are legally perceived has much to
say about the underpinnings of female-male relations in general.47
Specifically, the legal distinction between "sex" and "rape" reveals
the principles of domination and subordination that yet permeate
American law as it relates to women.
42. Younger v. Gianotti, 176 Tenn. 139, 140, 138 S.W.2d 448, 449 (1940).
43. 402 N.W.2d 146 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
44. Id. at 149 (emphasis added).
45. See Judith Martin, Miss Manners' Guide to Excruciatingly Correct Behavior
343-44 (1982); see also Lewis Hyde, The Gift: Imagination and the Erotic Life of
Property 93 (1983): "We still preserve the custom in the Protestant wedding cere-
mony, the minister asking the gathered families, 'Who giveth this woman to be
married?' and the father of the bride replying, 'I do.'" Id.
46. See Judith Martin, supra note 45, at 387.
47. See generally Susan Estrich, Real Rape (1987).
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A. Historical Underpinnings of Rape Law: Protecting
Men's Property
Laws prohibiting rape were created in early Western societies
to protect the property interests men held in their wives and
daughters. The crime a man committed in raping a woman was
that of stealing another man's property, or of diminishing its value
through "unlawful" sexual intercourse. 48 As society advanced,
however, so did its collective attitude toward rape-sort of. True,
rape today is generally accepted as an offense perpetrated against
the victim herself, rather than as a violation of the property rights
her father or husband holds in her.49 Yet, in a great many juris-
dictions today a man cannot be convicted for raping his wife.50
B. To Have, To Hold... and To Own: Marital Rape
Exceptions
A person commits the crime of forcible rape if he has sexual inter-
course with another person to whom he is not married, without
that person's consent by the use of forcible compulsion.
Missouri Rape StatuteS'
Legal recognition of the "marital rape exception" apparently
stems from a statement made by the British jurist Sir Matthew
Hale in the early eighteenth century: "[T]he husband cannot be
guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by
their mutual matrimonial consent and contract, the wife hath
given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot
48. To our Biblical forefathers, any carnal knowledge outside the mar-
riage contract was "unlawful." And any carnal knowledge within the
marriage contract was, by definition, "lawful." Thus, as the law
evolved, the idea that a husband could be prosecuted for raping his
wife was unthinkable, for the law was conceived to protect his inter-
ests, not those of his wife.
Susan Brownmiller, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 380 (1975); "The
earliest pronouncement of English institutional writers makes it clear that the law
against rape was intended to prevent the abduction of propertied virgins." Michael
Freeman, "But If You Can't Rape Your Wife, Who[m] Can You Rape?". the Mari-
tal Rape Exemption Re-Examined, 15 Fain. L. Q. 1, 8 (1981).
49. This is not to overlook the generally acknowledged and socially accepted
dispensation of a father or husband to kill the man who rapes his daughter or his
wife. See Randall Collins, A Conflict Theory of Sexual Stratification, 19 Soc. Probs.
3, 8 (1971).
50. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann., tit. 11, §§ 763, 764 (1988); Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 566.010,
566.030 (Vernon 1988); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 30-9-10E, 30-9-11 (1988); Tex. Penal Code
Ann. § 22.011 (c) (2) (Vernon 1987); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-61 B. (1988); see also Lisa
Kivett, Sexual Assault: The Case for Removing the Spousal Exemption from Texas
Law, 38 Baylor L. Rev. 1041, 1041 & n.1 (1986).
51. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 566.030(1) (Vernon 1989) (emphasis added).
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retract."5 2 Although Lord Hale cited no underlying common law
authority for this notion, it nevertheless became accepted legal
doctrine in both England and the United States.5 3
Several states have recently amended their penal codes to al-
low prosecution for marital rape.54 Alaska, for example, affirma-
tively abolished its statuory exemption for marital rape by adding
a section entitled "Spousal Relationship No Defense" to its crimi-
nal code.55 Likewise, the Ohio legislature passed an amendment in
1986 allowing prosecution for first-degree rape regardless of the re-
lationship between perpetrator and victim. 56 Men in Ohio remain
protected, however, from prosecution for any sexual assault short
of first degree rape they inflict on their wives.5 7
Like Ohio, Virginia has increased the complexity of its rape
statute instead of flatly discarding its marital rape exception. 58 As
of 1986, a man who forces intercourse on his wife may be prose-
cuted for rape only if he does not reside with her at the time, or if
in raping her, he causes "serious physical injury."59 Allegedly to
"fill in the gap," the Virginia legislature created an offense called
"marital sexual assault,"60 which allows prosecution even where
52. 1 Matthew Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown 629 (1736). Hale had
quite an impact on the development of rape law. In addition to penning the marital
rape exception, he is well remembered and often cited for the statement, "it must
be remembered [that rape] is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be
proved .. " Barbara Toner, Facts of Rape 96 (1977). Toner describes Hale as "the
most quoted authority on the British law of rape." Id. at 95; see also Gilbert Geis,
Lord Hale, Witches and Rape, 5 Brit. J.L. and Soc. 26 (1978).
53. See Commonwealth v. Fogarty, 74 Mass. 487 (8 Gray) (1857), apparently the
first recognition of the marital rape exception in American caselaw, and Frazier v.
State, 48 Tex. Crim. 142, 86 S.W. 754 (1905), a particularly graphic illustration of the
credit given Hale for "discovering" the exception; see also Annotation, Criminal Re-
sponsibility of Husband for Rape, Assault to Commit Rape, on Wife, 84 A.L.R.2d
1017, 1019 (1962).
54. See Lisa Kivett, supra note 50, at 1044 n.25; State v. Smith, 85 N.J. 193, 426
A.2d 38 (1981).
55. See Alaska Stat. §§ 11.41.443, .445(2) (1985).
56. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.02, .12 (Baldwin 1988).
57. See Ohio Rev. Code. Ann. § 2907.02 (Baldwin 1988).
58. See Va. Code Ann. §§ 18.2-61, 67.2:1 (1988).
59. If any person has sexual intercourse with his or her spouse and such
act is accomplished against the spouse's will by force, threat or intimi-
dation of or against the spouse or another, he or she shall be guilty of
rape.
However, no person shall be found guilty under this subsection
unless, at the time of the alleged offense... (ii) the defendant caused
serious physical injury to the spouse by the use of force or violence.
Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-61 (1988).
60. "An accused shall be guilty of marital sexual assault if (i) he or she engages
in sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anallingus or anal intercourse with his
or her spouse..., and (ii) such act is accomplished against the spouse's will by force
or a present threat of force .... Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-67.2:1 (1986).
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the husband and wife live with one another. Although this addi-
tion might seem, at first blush, a step forward, it actually adheres
closely to the notion that there is somehow a difference between a
man who sexually assaults a stranger and one who inflicts the very
same violence on his wife. It should come as no surprise that the
penalty for "marital sexual assault" is substantially less severe
than that for "rape." While the man who forces intercourse on a
stranger is put away for no less than five years, the man who rapes
his wife may, at the judge's discretion, receive a sentence of twelve
months or less, a fine of up to one thousand dollars or both.61
"Marital Sexual Assault" is further distinguished from rape
by a special provision in the Virginia code allowing a perpetrator
to avoid criminal conviction altogether. With the wife/victim's
consent, a judge may order a man convicted of the offense to un-
dergo counselling and therapy. After completion of the regimen
ordered, the court may dismiss the proceedings upon determining
that doing so will "promote maintenance of the family unit."62
Where marital rape exceptions exist, they almost always ex-
tend to "cohabiting" couples-that is, heterosexual couples who
are not legally married. For example, West Virginia's marital rape
exception defines "married" to include "persons living together as
husband and wife regardless of the legal status of their
relationship.' '63
Perhaps the most disturbing contemporary permutation of
the marital rape exception is its extension in a few states to men
who rape their "voluntary social companions." For instance, in the
state of Delaware "unlawful sexual intercourse in the second de-
gree" cannot be charged when the victim was the "voluntary social
companion" of the defendant.64 The Delaware statute further
states that "voluntary social companion means a victim who is in
61. Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-67.2:1C (1988).
62. Upon a finding of guilt ... , the court, without entering a judgment of
guilt, upon motion of the defendant and with the consent of the com-
plaining witness and the attorney for the Commonwealth, may defer
further proceedings and place the defendant on probation pending
completion of counseling or therapy .... If such counseling is com-
pleted..., the court may discharge the defendant and dismiss the pro-
ceedings against him if. . . the court finds such action will promote
maintenance of the family unit and be in the best interest of the com-
plaining witness.
Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-67.2:1D (1986).
63. "'Married,' . . . includes persons living together as man and wife regardless
of the legal status of their relationship." West Va. Code § 61-8B-1(2) (1986) (empha-
sis added).
64. "(a) A person is guilty of unlawful sexual intercourse in the first degree
when he intentionally engages in sexual intercourse with another person and...
(2) ... the defendant was not the victim's voluntary social companion on the occa-
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the defendant's company on the occasion of the offense as a result
of the victim's exercise of rational intellect and free will, without
trick, coercion or duress." 65
Although the state of Maine recently removed an explicit
marital rape exception from its criminal code, it continues to rec-
ognize a "voluntary social companion" defense:
Rape is a Class A crime. It is a defense to a prosecution under
subsection 1, paragraph B [defining rape], which reduces the
crime to a Class B crime that the victim was a voluntary social
companion of the defendant at the time of the crime and had,
on that occasion, permitted the defendant sexual contact or
voluntarily engaged in sexual contact with the defendant. 66
Interpreting this provision, the Maine Supreme Court con-
cluded, "[t]he essence of the voluntary social companion defense is
that the victim voluntarily induced the performance of the ulti-
mate sexual act by (1) being voluntarily present as a social com-
panion, and (2) permitting sexual contact, short of the sexual act,
itself, to occur." 67
That Ohio, Virginia, Maine and several other states maintain
a legal distinction between sexual violence perpetrated against a
stranger and that inflicted upon one's wife has several important
implications. First, accepting the premise that the threat of crimi-
nal prosecution does indeed carry some deterrence value, women
in those jurisdictions are denied a measure of legal protection from
sexual assault at the hands of their state-recognized marital part-
ners.68 Simply put, marital rape exceptions make it "more expen-
sion of the crime and had not permitted the defendant sexual intercourse within
the previous twelve months;..." Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 775 (1988).
65. Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 761(h); see also State v. Hamilton, 501 A.2d 778
(Del. 1985) aff'd 515 A.2d 397 (1986); Scott v. State, 521 A.2d 235 (Del. 1987).
66. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 252(3) (1964 and 1988 Supp.); see also State v.
Robinson, 496 A.2d 1067 (Me. 1985).
67. State v. Reed, 459 A.2d 178, 180 n.1 (Me. 1983) (emphasis added). In Reed,
the Maine court also extended the definition of voluntary social companion, and
hence the marital rape exception, to a man whose victim "voluntarily touches [his]
genitals." Id. at 180.
68. It is important to remember that many states have swept away the distinc-
tion between those who choose to participate in the formalities of church/state
marriage and those who do not, recognizing "cohabiting" heterosexual couples as
"married" for many legal purposes. As with much of the change American law has
undergone in the past century, this appears to be a progressive and desirable move
away from archaic, fundamentally religious notions toward a more equitable prac-
tice that reflects reality. However, as illustrated by quasi-exemptions for marital
rape like that adopted in Virginia, superficial alteration in legal status unaccompa-
nied by real change in social relations merely exposes more women to less costly
(from the perpetrator's perspective) sexual assault. This is not to argue for a re-
turn to strict legal recognition of Victorian notions of marriage. Rather, it is to sug-
gest that all legal change must be understood and reflected upon in the context of
the male-oriented society from which it springs.
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sive" for a man to rape a stranger (another man's woman) than to
rape his wife (his own woman).
Second, the existence of marital rape exceptions reveals that
women are still considered, on some level, the possessions of their
husbands/male lovers/"dates." Lord Hale's judicial disciples have
long attempted to justify exempting men from prosecution for rap-
ing their wives with the argument that a woman bargains away
her bodily integrity to her husband as part of their marriage "con-
tract."69 Given the contract paradigm, one would expect a wo-
man's standing consent to forced intercourse with her husband to
exist as a material term in the marital agreement, either expressly
or impliedly accepted by both parties. Yet, nowhere in the vows
common to both civil and religious marriage ceremonies is there
any mention of the woman's consent to sexual intercourse when-
ever her husband desires. Nor can it be reasonably implied that in
becoming married to a man, a woman intends to negotiate away
the right to refuse him sexual access.
Even assuming a woman agrees to submit to her husband's
every sexual advance, the notion that her consent is irrevocable
for the duration of their relationship runs counter to the principles
of contract law. Where a material term of a contract goes unful-
filled, a remediable breach occurs. Thus, to play out the contract
paradigm to its logical, though completely unrealistic conclusion, a
man who could prove that his wife refused to have sex with him
could recover damages from her for breaching their marital con-
tract. But a marital rape exception operates to allow him to ex-
tract "specific performance"-the extraordinary contract remedy
in any setting-and to do so through violence.
Hale's contract-based rationalization for the marital rape ex-
ception is entirely at odds with existing contract doctrine. It simply
cannot be demonstrated, through reference to the marital relation-
ship alone, that a woman either expresses or implies her com-
pletely irrevocable consent to sexual intercourse with her husband
for so long as she is married to him. The fallacy of the contract-
consent justification is even more clearly demonstrated where
marital rape exceptions have been extended to "unmarried cohabi-
tants." If the institution of state-recognized marriage indeed in-
volves a contractual relationship, then rejection of the institution
69. See State v. Smith, 148 N.J. Super. 219, 226-27, 372 A.2d 386, 390 (1977);
State v. Bell, 90 N.M. 134, 140, 560 P.2d 925, 931 (1977) ("[A] wife is irrebuttably
presumed to consent to sexual relations with her husband, even if forcible and
without consent. A husband is legally incapable of raping his wife."
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itself seems to clearly express a desire not to be bound by the
terms of that contract.
Despite the efforts of Lord Hale and two centuries of male
judges, marital rape exceptions cannot be written off as mere
terms in the marriage "contract." Rather, they far more clearly
reflect the underlying principles of property law, creating enforce-
able obligations by virtue of legally-defined status.
"Property," by one old definition, is a "right of action."
To possess, to enjoy, to use, to destroy, to sell, to rent, to give
or bequeath, to improve, to pollute-all of these are actions,
and a thing (or a person) becomes a "property" whenever
someone has "in it" the right of any such action.70
When society exempts a man from prosecution for raping his
wife, it effectively grants him a "right of action" against her
body-a legally enforceable claim to use, enjoy, indeed, possess her
sexuality. Whether that right derives from the transaction recog-
nized in law as marriage, through informal sexual use over a suffi-
cient period of time to amount to "cohabitation," or through
expectation of a "return" for serving as "social companion," the re-
sult is the same. Once a man can demonstrate some sexual tie to a
woman, the law steps in to protect his "rights" as possessor, with-
out regard for the woman/object he possesses. 71 Hence, disposing
of the contrivance necessary to package marital rape exceptions in
a contract-based rationale, those exceptions appear to fit quite
squarely within the confines of property law, protecting the right
of a man to the exclusive use of "his" woman. Indeed, viewed
through the property lens, marital rape exceptions appear as "sex-
ual easements," bestowing upon the holder certain legally recog-
nized use rights. As such, they are illustrative of the regulatory
nature of rape law in general, regulating who gets raped and
when, rather than prohibiting rape from happening.72
70. Lewis Hyde, supra note 45, at 94.
71. Wrongful power is often protected by law because law is the ordering
of power. Law organizes power. In a society where women and Blacks
have been legal chattel, the law is not premised on a sensitivity to
their human worth. Law protects "rights" - but mostly it protects
the "rights" of those who have power. The United States is a particu-
larly self-congratulatory nation. We say that we invented democracy
and that our Constitution represents the highest principles of civilized
governing. Yet our Constitution was designed to protect slavery and to
keep women chattel.
Andrea Dworkin & Catharine MacKinnon, supra note 20, at 17-18 (emphasis
added).
72. It has been the business of the state to regulate male use of sexual
force against women, not to prohibit it. The state may allow a man to
force his wife but not his daughter, or his wife but not his neighbor's
wife. Rather than prohibiting the use of force against women per se, a
male-supremacist state establishes a relationship between sexual force
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Marital rape exceptions reveal how deeply American law re-
mains mired in male domination. Although women are no longer
bought and sold as personal property, rape law in general, and its
treatment of marital rape specifically, suggest that women remain
objects in legal culture, their sexuality available for appropriation
by the man, or men, who can demonstrate a legally cognizable
claim to it. 73 This claim is itself rationalized in both law and social
custom as the product of a "natural" ordering of things. Rather
than candidly recognizing the legal distinction between "rape" and
"sex" as the product of a patriarchal society that embodies its own
values in the laws it generates, that distinction is rationalized as a
means of protecting the naturally, even divinely, ordained roles of
women and men in heterosexual relationships. This rationaliza-
tion is not unique to American law. For centuries, Western polit-
ical theorists have relied on "nature" to justify male control of
social power and resources.
and normalcy: in marriage, a woman has no right to refuse her hus-
band intercourse.... The society's opposition to rape is fake because
the society's commitment to forced sex is real: marriage defines the
normal uses to which women should be put, and marriage institution-
alizes forced intercourse.
Andrea Dworkin, RIGHT-WING WOMEN, supra note 11, at 85.
73. Virtually everything in Western culture related to relationships between
women and men reinforces the notion that a woman's sexuality is a possessible ob-
ject. "The rules for women in courtship delineate an image of woman as commod-
ity. Her power to attract is her 'capital,' which she should invest frugally to assure
an adequate future income." Judith Laws, The Second X: Sex Role and Social Rule
179 (1979). Commenting on Laws' interpretation, Edwin Schur states:
The common reference to a woman's physical appearance as her "as-
sets" supports this interpretation. So too does the frequent branding
of women who overtly display their sexualtiy as "cheap." What seems
to be implied by the use of that term is that such women are not plac-
ing a high enough price on their sexuality.
Edwin Schur, Labeling Women Deviant 165-66 (1984) (emphasis in original). Any
complete discussion of the commodity status of women must at least recognize the
blatant manifestation of that status in the institution of female prostitution.
[The] demand which fosters prostitution occurs because of the way in
which men and women have been taught to view themselves and
members of the opposite sex. Men have been socialized to view sex as
a commodity that can be purchased for a twenty-dollar bill .... [Wo-
men] have been conditioned to view themselves as sexual objects long
before junior high school and encouraged to exchange attractiveness
(or sexuality) for things like engagement rings or popularity.
Jennifer James, The Politics of Prostitution 39 (1975); see also Kathleen Barry, Fe-
male Sexual Slavery (1979). The obvious link between the institutions of prostitu-
tion and marriage was recognized by Engels in his essay on the bourgeois family:
"[marriage] often enough turns into the crasest prostitution...on the part of the
wife, who differs from the ordinary courtesan only in that she does not hire out her
body, like a wage-worker, on piecework, but sells it into slavery once and for all."
Friedrich Engels, supra note 8, at 742.
Law and Inequality
III. Of The "Natural" Order
Writing in the third century B.C.E.,74 Aristotle concluded
that all things, including people, act in accord with what nature in-
tends. The essence of a thing is revealed by its function, Aristotle
explained, because that thing naturally functions in accord with its
essence.75 Thus, women function primarily as passive receptacles
in the reproductive process not because men impose such an ar-
rangement, but because passivity and subordination accord with
women's collective essence.7 6 This notion of a naturally-mandated
female social role appealed to Thomas Aquinas as well. Translat-
ing much of Aristotle's thought into the context of medieval Chris-
tianity, Aquinas, as Aristotle before, argued that woman's social
role is inextricably linked to her necessary role in reproduction:
"It was necessary for woman to be made, as the Scripture says, as
a helper to man; not, indeed, as a helpmate in other works, as
some say, since man can be more efficiently helped by another
man in other works; but as a helper in the work of generation."7 7
74. The abbreviation for "Before the Common Era," B.C.E. is an alternative to
the theistic and entirely Christian "B.C."
75. "All things derive their essential character from their function and their ca-
pacity." Aristotle, Politics I § 1253 a., quoted in Susan Moeller Okin, Women in
Western Political Thought 74 (1979).
It is Aritstotle's view that the final cause of everything can be de-
termined by noting the actualization of those capacities inherent
within it from the start....
For Aristotle each separate thing's end is predetermined: it is des-
tined to fulfill its essence .... Aristotle assumes, with latter-day func-
tionalists who have borrowed from his method, that one can determine
what a thing (person, institution) is in terms of its function or "end."
Jean Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought
41-42 (1981) (citing Aristotle, Politics 5 (Ernest Barker ed. 1962)).
76. "A woman is, as it were an infertile male .. " Susan Moeller Okin, supra
note 75, at 82-83 (quoting 1 Aristotle, Generation of Animals 728a); "[A] male is
male in virtue of a particular ability, and a female in virtue of a particular inabil-
ity." Id. at 82-83, (quoting 4 Aristotle, Generation of Animals 766a); "In spite of her
widespread inabilities, then, woman is necessary for the reproduction of man, and
this is therefore seen by Aristotle as her natural function. After all, if it were not
for the requirements of sexual reproduction, this particular 'deformity in nature'
would never have existed." Id. at 83.
77. Thomas Aquinas, On the First Man in Philosophy of Woman: Classical to
Current Concepts 80 (Mary Mahowald ed. 1978). Like Artistotle before him, Aqui-
nas described women as not only inferior to men, but as a defective product of the
natural regenerative process:
As regards the individual nature, woman is defective and misbe-
gotten, for the active power in the male seed tends to the production
of a perfect likeness according to the masculine sex; while the produc-
tion of a woman comes from defect in the active power, or from some
material indisposition, or even from some external influence, such as
that of a south wind,. .
Id. at 80-81.
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Later thinkers, Bodin 78 and Filmer 79 among them, advanced
the paradigm of male domination a step further, likening man's su-
perior social role to the divinely-ordained authority vested in a
king-just as absolute authority over the realm rests with the
monarch, man retains absolute authority over his woman and his
offspring (the two being virtually identical in their relationships to
the governing male). Even Rousseau, famous for conceiving of civ-
ilization itself as a contractual relationship,8 0 could not resist as-
signing to women the status of social inferiors, rationalizing that
assignment with an appeal to nature. In Emile,81 for instance,
Rousseau described the "perfect" woman as the passive antithesis
of the strong, active male who guards and protects her.8 2 The
"natural" life, Rousseau explained, is that lived in male-dominated
monogamy, man enjoying the perfect servitude and subordination
of the woman he marries.8 3
These few examples suggest the general tendency of Western
political thought to leave the theoretical foundation of male domi-
nation virtually unquestioned. They also reflect the general ten-
dency of male theorists to ground acceptance of the patriarchal
78. Jean Bodin, c. 1530-96, argued for a well-ordered state characterized by a
fully sovereign monarch. Like his predecessors, Bodin found little use for women
beyond their biologically necessary role in reproduction, setting the domestic world
to which they were confined apart from the public, male world of the state. See
generally Julian Franklin, Jean Bodin and the Sixteenth-Century Revolution in
the Methodology of Law and History (1963).
79. Sir Robert Filmer, c. 1588-1653, was an early proponent of patriarchal social
order. His work is particularly interesting in the context of political thought about
women's social roles because he quite clearly did not distinguish between public
and private spheres of existence. For Filmer, reality was lumped into a single, indi-
visible whole, characterized by absolute male control. "Within Filmer's patriarchal-
ism, there are only subjects, never citizens. Each father in his little domain 'lords'
it over wives, children, and servants." Elshtain, supra note 75, at 103-04. Elshtain
takes a provocative, though substantively unfounded, stab at linking contemporary
feminism's demand that "public" and "private" be collapsed with Filmer's attempt
to do so. See Id. at 104-05. See generally James Daly, Sir Robert Filmer and Eng-
lish Political Thought (1979); Patriarcha & Other Political Works of Sir Robert
Filmer (Peter Laslett ed. 1949).
80. See Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (Willmore Kendall ed.
1954).
81. Jean Jacques Rousseau, Emile (Allan Bloom trans. 1979).
82. A perfect man and a perfect woman ought not to resemble each other
in mind any more than in looks. . . . One ought to be active and
strong, the other passive and weak.... [I]t follows that woman is made
specially to please man. If man ought to please her in turn, it is due to
a less direct necessity. His merit is in his power; he pleases by the sole
fact of his strength.
Id. at 358.
83. "[T]he patriarchal rural life," Rousseau instructs in Emile, is "man's origi-
nal life, the most peaceful, the most natural and the most pleasant for those whose
hearts are not corrupted." Jean Jacques Rousseau, Emile, quoted in Okin, supra
note 75, at 114.
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status quo on the "natural" relationship alleged to exist between
women and men. The two cases considered below, Bradwell v. Illi-
nois 8 4 and Muller v. Oregon,8 5 demonstrate that American law is
itself no stranger to these theoretical trends. Together, Bradwell
and Muller exemplify the historical attempt to mold American ju-
risprudence, and its practical, legal manifestations, in conformity
with contemporary socio-economic demands without disturbing the
basic parameters of male domination.8 6
A. No Women Need Apply: Bradwell v. Illinois87
In 1869, Myra Bradwell applied for admission to the Illinois
state bar. She had been tutored in law by her husband, Judge
James B. Bradwell,88 and started a legal newspaper, the Chicago
Legal News, that quickly gained wide circulation.8 9 Despite pass-
ing the state bar exam, Bradwell was denied admission by the Illi-
84. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
85. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
86. It is not surprising that this rationale came to the fore of American juris-
prudence during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as modes of pro-
duction moved out of the home and into the factory. American law's reception of
the notion that women are somehow "naturally" intended to function in the domes-
tic realm is arguably reflective of the separation between "home" and "workplace"
necessarily brought about by capitalist industrialization.
It is only under capitalism that material production as wage labor
and the forms of production taking place within the family, have been
separated so that the "economic" function of the family is ob-
scured. . . . Only with the emergence of capitalism has "economic"
production come to be understood as a "human" realm outside of
nature.
Eli Zaretsky, Capitalism, the Family, & Personal Life 26-27 (1976); "With the rise of
industry, capitalism 'split' material production between its socialized forms (the
sphere of commodity production) and the private labour performed predominantly
by women within the home. In this form male supremacy, which long antedated
capitalism, became an institutional part of the capitalist system of production." Id.
at 29. In part, this article is an attempt to answer some of the questions raised
about Zaretsky's analysis: "Zaretsky's approach also has a number of fundamental
weaknesses. First, Zaretsky offers no compelling reason why it must be women
who are relegated to the household sphere.' Why isn't it men? Or why not men
and women equally?" Michael Albert & Robin Hahnel, Marxism & Socialist The-
ory 211 (1981). A legal system that reinforces male-domination, enforcing (some-
times overtly, often subtly) the notion that women "belong" in the role of wife and
mother is at least part of the answer.
87. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873). The following portion of this essay draws on
the work of Nadine Taub and Elizabeth Schneider, particularly Women's
Subordination and the Role of Law in The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique
117 (David Kairys ed. 1982).
88. Sachs & Wilson, supra note 12, at 97.
89. Id. at 98; see also Leslie Goldstein, The Constitutional Rights of Women 67
(1988).
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nois Supreme Court specifically because of her sex.90 She
appealed to the United States Supreme Court armed with the ar-
gument that the fourteenth amendment's privileges and immuni-
ties clause opened every profession and vocation to all people,
Black and white, women and men. In a brief majority opinion, au-
thored by Justice Miller, the Court relied on its decision an-
nounced only the day before in The Slaughterhouse Cases91 to
reject Bradwell's claim:
The opinion just delivered in the Slaughter House
Cases... renders elaborate argument in the present case un-
necessary; for, unless we are wholly and radically mistaken in
the principle on which those cases are decided, the right to
control and regulate the granting of license to practice law in
the courts of a state is one of those powers which are not
transferred for its protection to the Federal government, and
its exercise is in no manner governed or controlled by citizen-
ship of the United States in the party seeking such license. 92
Although the majority was satisfied with simply relying on
the narrow Slaughterhouse interpretation of federally-protected
privileges and immunities, Justice Bradley added a concurring
opinion, joined by Justices Field and Swayne, that suggests the
real concerns Myra Bradwell's claim raised for the almost exclu-
sively male legal profession. Justice Bradley wrote:
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always rec-
ognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and desti-
nies of man and woman. Man is, or should be, woman's
protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity and
delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for
many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the
family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance,
as well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic
sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and func-
tions of woman- hood. The harmony, not to say the identity, of
interests and views which belong or should belong to the fam-
ily institution, is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a
distinct and independent career from that of her husband. So
firmly fixed was this sentiment in the founders of the common
90. [Wlhen the legislature gave to this court the power of granting
licenses to practice law, it was with not the slightest expectation that
this privilege would be extended equally to men and women.
Whatever, then, may be our individual opinions as to the admission of
women to the bar, we do not deem ourselves at liberty to exercise our
power in a mode never contemplated by the legislature, and inconsis-
tent with the usages of courts of the common law, from the origin of
the system to the present day.
In re Bradwell, 55 Ill. 535, 539-40 (1869).
91. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77-82 (1873).
92. Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 130.
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law that it became a maxim of that system of jurisprudence
that a woman had no legal existence separate from her hus-
band, who was regarded as her head and representative in the
social state....
The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the
noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of
the Creator. And the rules of civil society must be adapted to
the general constitution of things, and cannot be based upon
exceptional cases.93
Justice Bradley's opinion provides insight into two percep-
tions that grounded women's legal status at the turn of the cen-
tury. First, the opinion articulates the belief that men are both
different from and superior to women. Second, a clear line is
drawn between the "public" sphere of labor and production, natu-
rally controlled and inhabited by men, and the "private" sphere of
"housework" and motherhood, assigned by divine ordinance exclu-
sively to women. Veiled in talk of "noble and benign offices," the
clear implication of Bradley's concurrence is that a woman's place
is in the home.
B. There's No Place Like Home: Muller v. Oregon 94
Even as women took on employment outside the home, the
public-private ideology that kept Myra Bradwell from being admit-
ted to the Illinois bar continued as a strong undercurrent in Amer-
ican jurisprudence. In 1908, for example, the Supreme Court
relied on woman's allegedly "natural" role as domestic servant and
reproductive mechanism to uphold sex-specific labor regulations.
Muller v. Oregon 95 is remembered as the case in which the Court
turned away from its Lochner 96 -era prohibition against labor-pro-
tecting legislation, apparently persuaded by the renowned 113-page
brief filed by Louis Brandeis for the state of Oregon. While the
"Brandeis brief" 97 helped pave the way for legal discourse in-
formed by social science, it also relied heavily on the argument
that the sex-specific nature of the regulations at issue justified di-
verging from Lochner. "The brief portrayed as common knowl-
edge pseudo-scientific data regarding physical differences between
93. Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141-42 (Bradley, J., concurring).
94. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
95. Id.
96. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
97. Although Louis Brandeis actually filed the Muller brief, he received a great
deal of assistance in assembling the data that comprised it from Josephine Gold-
mark and Florence Kelly. Taub & Schneider, supra note 87, at 137 n.41; see also
Sex Discrimination and the Law, supra note 24, at 29.
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men and women, emphasizing the 'bad effects' of long hours on
women workers' health, 'female functions,' childbearing capacity,
and job safety, and on the health and welfare of future
generations." 98
For example, this statement, made by Jules Simon in the
French Senate in 1891, was included under the heading "The
State's Need of Protecting Women": '[Wihen we ask... for a
lessening of the daily toil of women, it is not only of the wo-
men that we think; it is not principally of the women, it is of
the whole human race. It is of the father, it is of the child, it is
of society, which we wish to re-establish on its foundation,
from which we believe it has perhaps swerved a little.'99
Justice Brewer's opinion for the Court suggests that although
Brandeis included data on the harmfulness of extended labor to
any worker, it was the argument based on woman's "natural" in-
feriority that carried the day:
That woman's physical structure and the performance of
maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle
for subsistence is obvious. This is especially true when the
burdens of motherhood are upon her .... [AInd as healthy
mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical well-
being of woman becomes an object of public interest and care
in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race.100
In language only slightly more subtle than that of the
Bradwell concurrence, Justice Brewer asserts that women are, by
nature, relegated to a subordinate role in society, the primary pur-
pose of which is producing "vigorous offspring." Indeed, the con-
cern for providing society with healthy mothers is what makes
women "objects of public interest" in the first place. This creates
the inescapable impression that women as women really aren't
worth legal protection. 10 1 It is only when their function in the
production of men's children is threatened that "public," legal rec-
ognition is required.
98. Taub & Schneider, supra note 87, at 128-129.
99. 16 Philip Kurland & Gerhard Casper, Landmark Briefs and Arguments of
the Supreme Court of the United States: Constitutional Law 48 (1975).
100. Muller, 208 U.S. at 421.
101. [B]eyond its direct, instrumental impact, the insulation of women's
world from the legal order conveys an important ideological message
to the rest of society. Although this need not be the case in all socie-
ties, in our society the law's absence devalues women and their func-
tions: women simply are not sufficiently important to merit legal
regulation.... In our society, law is for business and other important
things. The fact that the law in general has so little bearing on wo-
men's day-to-day concerns reflects and underscores their insignifi-
cance. Thus, the legal order's overall contribution to the devaluation
of women is greater than the sum of the negative messages conveyed
by individual legal doctrines.
Taub & Schneider, supra note 87, at 122.
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Criticizing the theoretical underpinnings of Justice Brewer's
opinion is not to overlook the positive effect it made possible.
Without question, the Court's movement away from stalwart oppo-
sition to labor-protective regulation was a victory for the working
class. All workers, women and men, suffer to some degree in a
capitalist structure, more so under capitalism untempered with
even minimal physical health safeguards. However, the potential
benefits the decision appeared to create for the working class can-
not be isolated from the negative implications it held for the fe-
male class. Justice Brewer unabashedly declared that nature itself
places women in a separate and inferior social role-a role their
legal status ought to reflect. Further, his opinion reinforced the
notion that law appropriately operates in assuring that woman's
limited role in the public sphere does not impair her capacity to
perform in her primary, private role as wife and mother.
By adopting the public-private distinction articulated in both
Bradwell and Muller, American law makes itself an instrument of
male-domination. It defines women as "naturally" suited to do-
mestic and, particularly, reproductive tasks and then cordons off
the context in which those tasks are accomplished-namely the
traditional, heterosexual family-as a "private" world, exempt
from legal intervention.
The public-private distinction fosters the perception that law
is intended for "important" things, "public" things, the things men
do and control. Women, in their naturally-ordained, domestic
existence, neither need nor warrant legal protection and recogni-
tion. As actors in the public realm, they may function on a super-
ficially equal legal footing with their male counterparts. But
behind the wall established by legal privacy, women's interests in
being treated as equals cannot overcome men's right to dominate
and control. When judges and legislators refuse to discard marital
rape exceptions, or police choose not to answer the call of a bat-
tered woman ("we can't interfere in domestic affairs"), or civil
courts fail to evict abusive husbands or enforce child support obli-
gations, they simply reify the myth that "a man's home is his cas-
tle," the boundaries of which ought, in most cases, be respected by
other men. Further, sealing-off a realm defined by a male-ori-
ented legal system as beyond the reach of legal regulation perpetu-
ates the notion that women, like other things in a man's house,
belong to him and are, hence, his to do with as he pleases. "By de-
clining to punish a man for inflicting injuries on his wife. . ., the
law implies [that] she is his property and he is free to control her
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as he sees fit."102
Isolating women in a realm that law will not enter also serves
the purpose of veiling real gender inequality in the smoke-and-
mirrors of legal "non-discrimination." While the public world of
capitalist production has occasionally been amended to appear
somewhat gender neutral, thereby deflecting overt social unrest,
the private realm continues to function according to the largely
unamended rules of male domination. In this way, men create a
social reality in which they have almost complete control. Human
existence is divided into two separate and independent realms, the
one governed by a system of laws built upon a foundation of collec-
tive male-dominance, the other protected from public intervention,
allowing the individual (male) to draw up the rules of the game, to
be the lord of his manor. This distinction is then rationalized as
the dictate of nature itself, mandating that it be embodied in and
reflected by law and, at the same time, assuring that "legal
equality" remains, for the most part, male-created false
consciousness., 0 3
Recognizing and criticizing the public-private distinction that
exists in American law is not an argument for the unreasoned ap-
plication of patriarchically generated regulation to all facets of
human existence. Legal recognition of, accommodation of, even
absence from intimate relationships might well be justifiable in a
non-patriarchal context. The existing public-private split, as ap-
plied to legal relationships between women and men-arbitrarily
creating a lesser sphere founded on the notion of impermeability
to public sanction, and assigning women to that sphere by natural
ordinance, there to fare as they will within a male-dominated so-
cial structure-is, however, entirely beyond the pale. The mis-
perception that life is indeed separable along that male-created
demarcation submerges oppression, abuse, and violence in female-
male relationships, allowing legal reality to deny lived reality. The
illusion is created that "a woman's relationship with her man is a
matter of interplay between two unique personalities, and can be
102. Taub & Schneider, supra note 87, at 122.
103. By placing the operation of law squarely in the public realm and, at
least rhetorically, removing itself from the "private realm" of personal
life and the family, the legal system created a distinction between a
public realm of life, which is a proper arena for legal or social regula-
tion, and another, fundamentally different sphere, which is somehow
outside the law's or society's authority to regulate. Thus, the legal sys-
tem has functioned to legitimate that very distinction by asserting it as
a natural, rather than socially imposed ground for different treatment.
Diane Polan, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy in The Politics of Law 298
(David Kairys ed. 1982).
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worked out individually."'104 Legal intervention is declared to be
neither desired nor desirable; absence of the law from the private
sphere is rationalized as a means of encouraging people to "work
things out for themselves," and to do so in the "privacy of their
own home." By approaching home and family with presumed self-
restraint, the state virtually assures public policy will be created
without notice of private reality, substantially limiting the role of
legal discourse in attacking and undermining gender inequality.
C. Smoke and Mirrors and Preferential Treatment:
Wimberly v. Labor & Industrial Relations
Commission' 05
In late August 1980, Linda Wimberly was seven months preg-
nant.106 She requested a leave of absence from the J.C. Penney
Department Store where she had clerked for three years' 0 7 Ad-
hering to its established policy, the store granted Wimberly a
"leave without guarantee of reinstatement."108 Linda gave birth in
November and was ready to return to work the first of December.
She was told, however, that her position had been filled and that
Penney's had nothing available to offer her.10 9
Shortly thereafter, Wimberly filed a claim for unemployment
compensation with the Missouri Division of Employment Secur-
ity.110 She was informed that she was not eligible for compensa-
tion under the Missouri Employment Security Act,"' which
disqualifies an individual who "has left his work voluntarily with-
out good cause attributable to his work or to his employer."112
104. Arthur Brittan & Mary Maynard, Sexism, Racism and Oppression 125
(1984).
105. 479 U.S. 511 (1987).
106. Wimberly v. Labor & Indus. Rel. Comm'n, 688 S.W.2d 344, 345 (Mo. 1985),
aff'd 479 U.S. 511 (1987).
107. Id.
108. "Pursuant to its established policy, the J.C. Penney Company granted
[Wimberly] a 'leave without guarantee of reinstatement,' meaning that [Wimberly]
would be rehired only if a position was available when [she] was ready to return to
work." Wimberly v. Labor & Indus. Rel. Comm'n, 479 U.S. 511, 513 (1987).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 288.050.1(1) (Vernon 1965 & Supp. 1989).
112. The Missouri statute reads in pertinent part: "a claimant shall be disquali-
fied for waiting week credit or benefits... if the deputy finds (1) [tlhat he has left
his work voluntarily without good cause attributable to his work or to his em-
ployer." Mo. Ann. Stat. § 288.050.1(1) (Vernon 1965 and Supp. 1989). It must be
noted that as of 1989, a claimant who presents competent medical evidence that she
must leave work due to pregnancy, and then returns to work as soon as she is
deemed medically capable of doing so, is eligible for unemployment compensation.
Mo. Ann. Stat. § 228.050.1 (1)(c) (Supp. 1989). That the state of Missouri has chosen
to make this amendment to its policy does not alter the Court's interpretation of
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Wimberly was told by the Division deputy who dealt with her
claim that women who left their jobs due to pregnancy were con-
sidered to be leaving "voluntarily" and, thus, were ineligible to re-
ceive unemployment compensation.113
Wimberly appealed the decision to the division's appeals tri-
bunal to no avail. The tribunal concluded that:
Although the claimant did have a good reason for leaving her
employment, it is found that that reason was in no way attrib-
utable to her work or to her employer. Accordingly, it is
found that the claimant quit her job voluntarily on August 23,
1980, without good cause attributable to her work or to her
employer. 114
When the Missouri Labor and Industrial Relations Commis-
sion denied her petition for review, Wimberly filed a petition in
the Circuit Court of Jackson County.1 5 The court reversed the
Commission's decision, concluding that the Missouri employment
security statute's compensation provision ran afoul of federal stan-
dards imposed upon states receiving federal assistance for their un-
employment insurance programs. The circuit court held that
section 3304(a)(12) of the Internal Revenue Code,116 which man-
dates that "no person shall be denied compensation under [a state
unemployment compensation] law solely on the basis of pregnancy
or termination of pregnancy," prohibited recognizing pregnancy or
its termination as a justification for denying compensation to
otherwise eligible women."17
On appeal to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District,
the circuit court's decision was affirmed.l 18 The appellate court
joined the circuit court in relying upon the Fourth Circuit's inter-
pretation of section 3304 in Brown v. Porcher.119 In Brown, South
Carolina's policy of denying unemployment compensation to wo-
men who left their jobs due to pregnancy was challenged as incon-
gruous with the requirements of section 3304. Both the United
the Internal Revenue Code's requirements regarding unemployment insurance
programs.
113. "The deputy [for the Division] determined that [Wimberly] had 'quit be-
cause of pregnancy' and, therefore, had left work voluntarily and without good
cause attributable to [her] work or to [her] employer." Wimberly, 688 S.W.2d at
345.
114. Id.
115. Wimberly, 479 U.S. at 513.
116. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(12) (1982) reads: "The Secretary of Labor shall approve
any State law submitted to him, within 30 days of such submission, which he finds
provides that .... (12) no person shall be denied compensation under such State
law solely on the basis of pregnancy or termination of pregnancy." Id.
117. 479 U.S. at 513.
118. Id.; Wimberly, 688 S.W.2d at 346.
119. 660 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1150 (1983).
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States District Court for the District of South Carolina and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed that
section 3304 "unambiguous[ly]" prohibited such law.120 The
United States Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari, although
Justice White, joined by Justices Powell and Rehnquist, dissented,
concluding that, "[ilt is by no means clear.. . that section 3304(a)
(12) does not simply provide that pregnancy must be treated like
all other disabilities-that pregnancy simply cannot be singled out
for unfavorable treatment."121
On April 2, 1985, the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the
court of appeals decision regarding Linda Wimberly's claim to un-
employment compensation. 122 While concluding that the lower
courts were correct in considering the Fourth Circuit decision in
Brown v. Porcher, the only reported case construing section
3304(a)(12), 123 the court rejected the notion that it was bound by
statutory constructions of federal courts other than the United
States Supreme Court.124 Instead, persuaded by Justice White's
dissent, the court concluded that Congress did not intend section
3304 to create the "sweeping ban" the Fourth Circuit found the
provision embodies.125 What Congress did intend to proscribe
through section 3304 was a state policy that denied unemployment
compensation solely because of pregnancy; because the Missouri
provision made no specific reference to pregnancy as a disqualify-
ing factor, it was not in conflict with section 3304.126
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari127 and,
in a unanimous opinion authored by Justice O'Connor, affirmed
the Missouri Supreme Court's decision. 128 The Court framed the
dispute as whether section 3304 "mandates preferential treatment
for women who leave work because of pregnancy."' 129 Contrary to
Wimberly's assertions and to the Fourth Circuit's decision in
Brown v. Porcher, Justice O'Connor found that:
The plain import of the language of § 3304(a)(12) is that Con-
gress intended only to prohibit States from singling out preg-
nancy for unfavorable treatment.... Thus, a State could not
decide to deny benefits to pregnant women while at the same
120. Wimberly, 688 S.W.2d at 348.
121. Porcher v. Brown, 459 U.S. 1150 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
122. Wimberly, 688 S.W.2d 344 (Mo. 1985).
123. Id. at 347.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 349.
126. Id.
127. 475 U.S. 1118 (1986).
128. Wimberly v. Labor & Indus. Rel. Comm'n, 479 U.S. 511 (1987). (Justice
Blackmun did not participate in the decision).
129. Id. at 516.
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time allowing benefits to persons who are in other respects
similarly situated: the 'sole basis' for such a decision would be
on account of pregnancy. 130
But the challenged Missouri provision was facially neutral, only
"incidentally" disqualifying pregnant or formerly pregnant women
from receiving unemployment compensation as part of a larger
group of justifiably ineligible claimants.131
[U]nder Missouri law, all persons who leave work for reasons
not causally connected to the work or the employer are dis-
qualified from receiving benefits. To apply [the Missouri com-
pensation policy], it is not necessary to know that petitioner
left because of pregnancy; all that is relevant is that she
stopped work for a reason bearing no causal connection to her
work or her employer. Because the State's decision could have
been made without ever knowing that petitioner had been
pregnant, pregnancy was not the 'sole basis' for the decision
under a natural reading of § 3304(a)(12)'s language.132
Justice O'Connor pointed to the Vietnam Era Veterans' Re-
adjustment Assistance Act of 1974133 and to the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973134 as examples of similarly worded statutes construed by
the Court to prohibit discrimination "against otherwise qualified
individuals," rather than to require that employers provide "spe-
cial treatment" for disadvantaged individuals.135 Further, beyond
the "plain language" of section 3304, the Court was persuaded that
nothing in the legislative history of the statute suggested an inten-
tion to create something more than a prohibition against singling
out pregnant women for disadvantageous treatment.136 Neither
the House nor the Senate Committee Reports hinted "that Con-
gress disapproved of, much less intended to prohibit, a neutral rule
such as Missouri's."'137
Finally, Justice O'Connor found the Missouri Supreme
Court's decision entirely consistent with the Department of La-
bor's interpretation of section 3304. In two communications to
state governments, the Department emphasized that the provision
"'does not speak to treating pregnant claimants more favorably. It
only requires that they not be disqualified solely on the basis of
pregnancy or its termination.' "138 Because section 3304 does not
130. Id.
131. Id. at 517.
132. Id.
133. 38 U.S.C. § 2021(b)(3) (1982).
134. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
135. Wimberly, 479 U.S. at 517-18 (quoting Southeastern Community College v.
Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410 (1979)).
136. Id. at 518-19.
137. Id. at 521.
138. Id. at 522 (quoting United States Dept. of Labor, Employment and Training
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require "preferential treatment" for women, the Court concluded,
it also does not prohibit Missouri from denying pregnant women
unemployment compensation when they leave their jobs in order
to give birth and are subsequently denied the opportunity to re-
turn to work.139
D. Looking at Wimberly Through Private Eyes140
Justice O'Connor's Wimberly opinion may be understood to
rest on either of two antithetical foundations. From one perspec-
tive, the decision seems firmly rooted in the notion of "equal treat-
ment." Rather than imagining, and then focusing almost
exclusively upon, woman's disadvantageous physical structure and
"maternal functions" as did Justice Brewer in Muller,141 the Wim-
berly Court recognizes all workers, regardless of sex, as similarly
situated individuals in the labor marketplace. Gone are the refer-
ences to woman's duty to provide "vigorous offspring"142 and the
veiled assertions that a woman really belongs at home and must,
therefore, be protected on the job from anything that might im-
pede the fulfillment of her "natural" role there. Indeed, Wim-
berly may be taken as simply a manifestation of the principle of
equal protection-"that people who are similarly situated in fact
must be similarly treated by the law."'143 From this perspective,
Wimberly illustrates the positive change that has taken hold, both
in law and in society at large, since Myra Bradwell fought for a
place at the Illinois bar.144
A second, very different perspective reveals an equally differ-
ent vision of Wimberly. By shifting focus from Wimberly's bare
mandate of identical treatment with regard to unemployment com-
pensation, a wider, more comprehensive frame of reference is at-
tainable-a frame that encompasses not only the notion of "equal
treatment," but the underlying material reality of that notion as
well. From this alternative perspective, one is able to see past the
Court's persistent "antidiscrimination" language to the presump-
Administration, Unemployment Insurance Service, Supplement No. 1 - Questions
and Answers Supplementing Draft Language and Commentary to Implement the
Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976 - P.L. 94-566, at 26 (1976)).
139. Id.
140. Much of the following section was greatly aided by Martha Minow's
exploration of the "dilemma of difference" in The Supreme Court, 1986 Term,
Forward: Justice Engendered, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 10 (1987).
141. 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908).
142. Muller, 208 U.S. at 421.
143. See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus TenBroek, The Equal Protection of the
Laws, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341 (1949); Taub & Schneider, supra note 87, at 130.
144. See supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
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tions the Court necessarily adopts in its implicit definition of
"discrimination."
In order to frame the Wimberly issue as one of "equal" ver-
sus "special" treatment,145 the Court must establish male workers
as the backdrop against which to view discrimination. Although
this presumption remains unstated, it is necessary to the conclu-
sion that accommodating pregnancy requires "discriminatory" ac-
tion. Only by establishing men as the status quo, and the
treatment they are accorded in the workplace as the measure of
"equal" treatment, can O'Connor and the Court logically conclude
that pregnancy, a circumstance that can only physically affect wo-
men, cannot be taken into consideration without granting preg-
nant workers "special" treatment. The bottom line must be that
the template for equal treatment is male treatment.
This conclusion, in turn, implies a workplace and employ-
ment conditions designed exclusively for men. Any reform of the
sort necessary to accommodate the biological reality of pregnancy
can only come at the legally-established expense of male workers.
Women may enter the work environment only so long as they as-
similate; that is, only through "being men." Circumstances depart-
ing from the male norm can only be accommodated through the
provision of "special," "preferential" treatment, violating the "ob-
jective" legal tenets of "equal" treatment. The public, extra-do-
mestic realm hence remains primarily male-defined and male-
oriented, even as increasing numbers of women are grudgingly al-
lowed to enter it.
E. Unlinking Private Reality From Public Policy Through
Legal Objectivity
Contemplating Wimberly from the perspective that reveals it
as a mandate for assimilation to male public norms exposes how
closely the Court's reasoning is linked to public/private ideology.
Not only does the equal treatment-special treatment distinction
adopted by the Court presume that women will function as men
on the job, it further presumes that women and men come to the
workplace on a level legal footing. These presumptions require
the Court to take a tabula rasa approach, ignoring the substan-
tially different legal status women and men are assigned outside
the workplace. By adopting such an approach, Wimberly reasons
a wall into place between the public life and private reality of wo-




men, creating policy for the former with no hint that the latter
even exists.
Perhaps appearing merely a quibble as to theory, this criti-
cism of Wimberly takes on concrete implications when placed in
the factual context surrounding Linda Wimberly's claim. Among
the private realities "objectified" out of the Court's consideration
is the long-standing existence of a marital rape exception in Mis-
souri. Four times since 1980, Missouri courts have reaffirmed that
exception. 146 Taking this into account undercuts the Court's asser-
tion that pregnancy is no different than any other reason one
might have for voluntarily leaving a job. Furthermore, the exist-
ence of a marital rape exception suggests the larger fallacy inher-
ent in the assumption that pregnancy itself is necessarily
voluntary and thereby reasonably categorized with other reasons a
worker might have for deciding to depart her or his place of em-
ployment. The Wimberly analysis completely disregards that a
woman in Linda Wimberly's position might be leaving her job due
to a pregnancy forcibly inflicted on her by the man she married-a
man whose sexual violence the state chooses to ignore so long as it
is directed toward her. And even if that same woman was forcibly
impregnated by a stranger (i.e. "raped") whom she resisted suffi-
ciently to escape the broad sweep of male-defined "consent," she
may yet be forced to carry the pregnancy to term by a legal system
that recognizes only her ability to choose to terminate an un-
wanted pregnancy. 147 Whether or not she actually has the oppor-
tunity to exercise that choice may be limited by her financial
capability-itself potentially dependent on a wage that is only
sixty percent of what a similarly situated male could expect.148 By
ignoring the private reality of subordination and inequality that is
experienced by women, the Wimberly Court implicitly reifies the
public/private distinction, giving legal life to an unfounded ideo-
logical construct. In doing so, the Court furthers the notion that
"discrimination" and "inequality" can only be ascertained through
reference to male-defined and male-oriented norms.149
146. See State v. Taylor, 726 S.W.2d 335 (Mo. 1987); State v. Badakhsan, 721
S.W.2d 18 (Mo. App. 1986); State v. Maynard, 714 S.W.2d 552 (Mo. App. 1986); State
v. Thurber, 625 S.W.2d 931 (Mo. App. 1981).
147. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
148. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Male Female Differences in Work Experi-
ence, Occupation, and Earnings: 1984, Series P-70, No. 10 Current Population Re-
ports 4-5 (1987).
149. See Minow, supra note 140, at 43 ("By allowing employers to ignore the dif-
ference of pregnancy, the Court keeps in place the assumption that equal treatment
is measured by a male norm.")
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In order to comprehend Wimberly in the context of continu-
ing gender inequality, one must recognize that the Court attended
only to the public, and therefore male, world, ignoring the less vis-
ible reality of women's bifurcated legal existence. Equally impor-
tant, however, is recognizing how legal discourse makes such
sleight of hand possible.
"The separation of public from private is as crucial to the lib-
eral state's claim to objectivity as its inseparability is to women's
claim to subordination."1 5 0 Fundamental to American jurispru-
dence is the notion of legal objectivity-that courts ought to act
dispassionately, with neither predisposition between parties nor in-
terests of their own.' 51 The Wimberly Court effected such a
stance by "objectively" squaring the Missouri unemployment com-
pensation policy with the "purely nondiscriminatory" federal re-
quirements manifest in section 3304. This could not have been
accomplished without disregarding the private legal reality that
follows women into the public sphere. In essence, the public-pri-
vate ideology adopted in Wimberly embodies the largely mythical
distinctions drawn between "moral," "political," and "legal" deci-
sion-making. "In Anglo-American jurisprudence, moral [value
judgments] are deemed separable and separated from politics
(power contests), and both from adjudication (interpretation)."152
Legal objectivity filters out the moral and the political, casting its
dispassionate adjudicative sights only toward properly framed
"legal" issues. Hence, in Wimberly the challenged Missouri statute
could be viewed in a context devoid of marital rape exceptions,
abortion prohibitions and other real facts of women's lives. Yet,
this demarcation between law and "everything else," between sub-
jective, private reality and objective, judicial decision-making al-
lows the mere form of equality to supersede equality of
substance-ideological construct to overtake material reality.
Wimberly demonstrates how judicial aperspectivity, within the
confines of a legal system that established treatment of males as
150. Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward
Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 Signs 635, 656 (1983) [hereinafter Signs II]. My analysis
in these final sections is in large part the product of Professor MacKinnon's two
Signs articles, see id. and Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and
the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 Signs 515 (1982) [hereinafter Signs /], and her
1987 book, Feminism Unmodified.
151. "Neutrality, including judicial decision making that is dispassionate, imper-
sonal, disinterested, and precedential, is considered desirable and descriptive.
Courts, forums without predisposition among parties and with no interest of their
own, reflect society back to itself resolved." Signs II, supra note 150, at 655.
152. Id. at 655.
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the status quo, operates as a tool of male hegemony.153 The
Court's guarantee of "equal treatment" thus becomes the guaran-
tee that every pregnant woman will be treated just as is every
pregnant man.
Looking at Wimberly through "private eyes," one observes
how "objectivity" as a jurisprudential doctrine functions to assure
woman's objectification. Paring away the "extraneous," subjective
details of private existence and dispassionately surveying only that
which law defines for itself as relevant, legal discourse effectively
ignores that moment within which inequality is generated. "The
very place (home, body), relations (sexual), activities (intercourse
and reproduction), and feelings (intimacy and selfhood) that femi-
nism finds central to women's subjection"154 are precisely what
law "objectifies" out of existence. In this way, law itself assures
that the private sphere remains inviolate and, by refusing to in-
form public equality discourse with the private reality of male
domination, necessarily adopts the private definition of
womanhood.155
F. American Liberalism: Managing Inequality Through
"Equal Treatment" Ideology
Looking at the Wimberly decision from a perspective in-
formed by women's private reality reveals comfortable American
153. Closely related to the law's role as an exponent of particular ideolo-
gies that support male supremacy, such as the public/private ideology,
is its hegemonic function in support of patriarchy. While the concept
of hegemony has thus far been articulated and applied in the context
of understanding and explaining the class domination of advanced in-
dustrial society, it may also be useful to apply this concept in trying to
understand how male supremacy is maintained. In respect to patri-
archy, a set of ideas could be said to operate hegemonically to the ex-
tent it succeeds in convincing women that their inferior political,
economic, and social status, as well as their subordination to husbands
and fathers within the family unit, is a result of a natural division of
the world into separate spheres and natural differences between male
and female personalities that suit women and men for different roles,
rather than the result of exploitation and domination.
Diane Polan, supra note 103, at 298-99.
154. Id. at 657.
155. To fail to recognize the meaning of the private in the ideology and
reality of women's subordination by seeking protection behind a right
to that privacy is to cut women off from collective verification and
state support in the same act .... This right to privacy is a right of
men "to be let alone" to oppress women one at a time. It embodies
and reflects the private sphere's existing definition of womanhood....
It is at once an ideological division that lies about women's shared ex-
perience and that mystifies the unity among the spheres of women's
violation. It is a very material division that keeps the private beyond
public redress and depoliticizes women's subjection within it.
Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified 101-02 (1987).
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liberalism as a guarantor of continued inequality. Retaining the
Millian156 notion that inequality can be managed by replacing the
ideology of "status" with that of "contract," liberal jurisprudence
simply asserts that all are now equal-free to bargain in a vast
marketplace governed only by the dispassionate forces of individ-
ual wants and needs. Hence, marriage can be spoken of as a con-
tractual arrangement, and irrevocable consent to sexual imposition
perceived as merely a part of the bargain. Guaranteeing that wo-
men will be treated just as men in the limited areas of the public
sphere open to both, however, fails to even address the roots of
gender inequality, leaving them hidden away in the dimly lit cor-
ners of women's private reality. The concept of "equal treatment"
in traditional American jurisprudence thus operates in large part
as an ideological, rather than material, construct, distorting what is
real by filtering it through a system of male-oriented presupposi-
tions and defining what remains as "objective reality." The imper-
meability of the private realm to legal intervention and alteration
is thereby assured, as is the status quo of male domination in both
public and private spheres. 15 7
G. An Alternative Perspective: Feminist Jurisprudence
In order to collapse the public/private distinction into a single
conceptualization of reality, one must comprehend the exclusively
sex-based nature of gender inequality. Indeed, one must grasp that
women are inflicted with inferior status by and in law precisely be-
cause they are women. Feminist critique is uniquely capable of re-
vealing and articulating this conceptualization. Beginning with the
proposition that "the molding, direction, and expression of sexual-
ity organizes society into two sexes-women and men-which divi-
156. See generally John Stuart Mill & Harriet Taylor Mill, Essays on Sex Equal-
ity (1970).
157. Unfortunately, leftist critiques, for the most part rooted in Marxist analysis,
also fail to comprehend fully the exclusively sex-based component of gender ine-
quality. As Professor Catharine MacKinnon points out, Marxism and feminism
proffer specific theories, independent of one another, about the underpinnings of
power distribution - an independence that is not unintended. "[Marxism and fem-
inism] exist to argue, respectively, that the relations in which many work and few
gain, in which some fuck and others get fucked, are the prime moment of politics."
Signs I, supra note 150, at 517 (footnote omitted). Since Engels noted that the first
class antagonism and oppression was like (rather than simply was) man's oppres-
sion of woman, Friedrich Engels, supra note 8, at 739, Marxist analysis has at-
tempted to explain gender inequality in terms of economic class inequality.
However, by interpreting all social phenomena exclusively in class terms, Marxism
stops short of comprehending the purely sexual aspect of gender inequality. No
less than liberalism, Marxism does not, indeed cannot, recognize that women are
subjected to inequality because they are women. Woman as worker may well be
liberated, but woman as woman remains bound.
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sion underlies the totality of social relations," feminism observes
American law from a perspective that reveals the ideological na-
ture of "equal treatment" discourse.158
Without acknowledging that the very concept "woman" car-
ries with it the social status of "inferior," "subordinate," and "ob-
ject," it is possible to assume that merely lowering the overt,
traditional barriers to women's participation in the public sphere
will eradicate gender-based inequality. Feminism confronts this
component of legal "objectivity"--denial of the relevance of wo-
men's lived reality in a complete sense to the legal reality imposed
on them-as a root cause of male hegemony. This confrontation is
accomplished by recognizing that social power is, indeed, gendered.
"Male and female are created through the erotization of domi-
nance and submission. The man/woman difference and the domi-
nance/submission dynamic define each other. This is the social
meaning of sex and the distinctively feminist account of gender in-
equality."15 9 Feminist critique alone, because it is cognizant of wo-
man as woman, reveals the necessary link between legal
"objectivity" and female "objectification." Unlike male-oriented
legal discourse of the sort illustrated by Bradwell,160 Muller,161
and Wimberly,162 feminist jurisprudence does not choose to imag-
ine, indeed is incapable of imagining, a public world separate from
and independent of private reality.
The private sphere, which confines and separates [women], is
therefore a political sphere, a common ground of [female/
male] inequality. In feminist translation, the private sphere is
a sphere of battery, marital rape, and women's exploited labor;
of the central social institutions whereby women are deprived
of (as men are granted) identity, autonomy, control, and self-
determination; and of the primary activity through which male
supremacy is expressed and enforced. Rather than tran-
scending the private as a predicate to politics, feminism
politicizes it. For women, the private necessarily transcends
the private. If the most private also most "affects society as a
whole," the separation between public and private collapses as
anything other than potent ideology.16 3
Of course, the bare fact that feminist critique is capable of ad-
dressing a fundamental cause of gender inequality that is con-
sciously bypassed by other perspectives-that is, the objectification
inherent in the public-private distinction-is no guarantee that
158. Signs I, supra note 150, at 516.
159. Signs H, supra note 150, at 635.
160. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873); supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
161. 208 U.S. 412 (1908); supra notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
162. 479 U.S. 511 (1987); supra notes 106-133 and accompanying text.
163. Signs II, supra note 150, at 657.
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legal discourse can or will inform itself with what feminism
reveals. As demonstrated throughout this essay, American law has
a long history of male-identification and male-orientation. It has
operated and continues to operate as a vehicle of male authority
through its acceptance, both explicit and implicit, of male domina-
tion as the desired status quo. Although the continued identifica-
tion of American law with expressions of male authority is a
significant hurdle that must be cleared in attempting to effect
legal change in the patriarchal social order, it is not the only such
hurdle. Law itself functions as hegemonic ideology, asserting it-
self, and receiving social acceptance, as the rational and legitimate
mechanism for resolving disputes.164 The material result for wo-
men is a two-headed beast: law embodies male authority through
its absence in that context that gives rise to gender inequality and,
at the same time, displaces other mechanisms of effecting social
change, thereby assuring that inequality remains immune to so-
cially-accepted eradication.165
Recognizing the link between law and male authority as heg-
emonic powers raises the question of whether legal discourse can
function as a mechanism for eradicating existing inequality, or in-
stead should be perceived as merely an ideological diversion that
actually guarantees maintenance of the status quo.
The reliance on litigation reflects the belief in law as a source
of social change, while ignoring the ideological power of law to
mask social reality and block social change. Court battles
164. The law acts hegemonically to assure people that their particular con-
sciences can be subordinated-indeed, morally must be subordinated-
to the collective judgment of society. It may compel conformity by
granting each individual his right of private judgment, but it must
deny him the right to take action based on that judgment when in con-
flict with the general will. Those who would act on their own judg-
ment as against the collective judgment embodied in the law find
themselves pressed from the moral question implicit in any particular
law to the moral question of obedience to constituted authority. It ap-
pears mere egotism and antisocial behavior to attempt to go outside
the law unless one is prepared to attack the entire legal system and
therefore the consensual framework of the body politic.
Eugene Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll 27-28 (1976).
165. A good example of this phenomenon is found in the suffragist move-
ment of the early twentieth century. "Operating within the male-
dominant paradigm, the form, language, and mode of Suffragist pro-
test was set not so much by the objective conditions of female oppres-
sion as by their response to the idealizations and mystifications and
legalities which rationalized continuance of the status quo." Thus, the
suffragist, in not challenging the ideology of law which supported an
ideology of women, perpetuated the mystifications which supported
the status quo.
Janet Rifkin, supra note 8, at 296 (quoting Jean Elshtain, Moral Woman and Im-
moral Man: A Consideration of the Public-Private Split and Its Political Ramifica-
tions, 4 Pol. & Soc'y 453, 469 (1974)).
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about "women's issues" are waged and sometimes won with
the result that a new body of rights is created and deployed in
battle, but the basic sexual hierarchy is not changed.166
By framing disputes like that in Wimberly in terms of individual
access to social resources-hence, as disputes between women and
men-legal discourse obscures the fundamental questions of power
distribution that underlie such disputes.
The crucial point is that these battles reflect anger and
dissatisfaction which, in reality, potentially threaten the patri-
archal hierarchy. The power of law is that by framing the is-
sues as questions of law, claims of right, precedents and
problems of constitutional interpretation, the effect is to divert
potential public consciousness from an awareness of the
deeper roots of the expressed dissatisfaction and anger. The
ideology of law serves to mask the real social and political
questions underlying these problems of law. At the same time,
the paradigm of law which has historically been and continues
to be the symbol of male authority is not only unchallenged
but reinforced as a legitimate mechanism for resolving social
conflict. 16 7
The problem thus becomes whether litigation, as the modus oper-
andi of legal discourse, is itself a desirable means of attacking pa-
triarchy, or whether, stripped of its imposed legitimacy, it exists
more realistically as a mechanism of cooptation.168 Perhaps law
should be understood to divert attention from the existence of, and
hence, from the need to address, gender-based inequality and op-
pression wherever it exists. Legal discourse would then appear to
confine attacks on inequality to narrowly-defined, legally-articul-
able claims, resulting in both the channeling of energy away from
the material oppression that pervades women's "private" lives and
reinforcement for the belief that legal change, constrained within
its own patriarchal context, is legitimate change.
In the end, patriarchy as a form of power and social order will
166. Janet Rifkin, supra note 8, at 296.
167. Janet Rifkin, supra note 8, at 297.
168. [W]e cannot underestimate the practical limitations we face with any
law-oriented strategy. The experience of going to court on a regular
basis underscores the pervasive maleness of the legal system: it is a
system infused with sexist values. Regardless of the language of a stat-
ute, it is individual judges who decide cases. The judiciary remains
overwhelmingly male. Judges have grown up in a patriarchal culture;
their attitudes are inevitably shaped by their life experiences and by
their position as the beneficiaries of male supremacy. Similarly, the
juries who weigh women's claims of sex discrimination and pass judg-
ment on the guilt of rape defendants are made up of people who have
lived their entire lives in a male supremacist culture .... The whole
structure of law-its hierarchical organization; its combative, adver-
sarial format; and its undeviating bias in favor of rationality over all
other values-defines it as a fundamentally patriarchal institution.
Diane Polan, supra note 103, at 301.
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not be eliminated unless the male power paradigm of law is
challenged and transformed. In order to challenge the male
paradigm of law, the origin of law as a form of male authority
and power must be discovered and examined more
thoroughly. 169
The lone conclusion that law is a wholly ineffective mecha-
nism for altering patriarchal social relations is likely neither par-
ticularly satisfying nor much of an incentive to continue pursuing
legal avenues in the struggle for social change. And indeed, the
point here is not to suggest that Mao was entirely correct in assert-
ing that all political power grows out of the barrel of a gun and
that, therefore, legal discourse is a complete waste of time. Many
women in contemporary American society do experience a differ-
ent, less oppressive reality than their mothers and grandmothers
did; and much of what appears to be lasting change in gender rela-
tions was either the product of litigation or has at least been recog-
nized in modern law. However, identifying the unquestionably
patriarchal roots of American jurisprudence, and linking those
roots with somewhat more subtle, but nonetheless observable,
manifestations of inequality in contemporary American law signals
the care with which legal discourse should be approached as a
means of addressing and eventually eradicating social wrongs. The
legal battle against sexism must be expanded to include arguments
that confront not only what the law says, but also what exactly
law is. Real, lasting social change cannot be effected through wip-
ing marital rape exceptions off the books without at the same time
confronting how American jurisprudence has made room for those
medieval constructs well into the twentieth century. 170 Indeed,
only through recognizing the hegemonic functions of male author-
ity and of law itself, and confronting the symbiotic relationship be-
tween the two, can legal discourse broaden sufficiently to
incorporate a single conception of women's reality. The struggle
against gender inequality in the legal context cannot otherwise
succeed.
169. Janet Rifkin, supra note 8, at 297.
170. Catharine MacKinnon, supra note 20, at 100-01.
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